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Standard wage discrimination models assume that independent observers are able to 
distinguish a priori which workers are suffering from discrimination. However, this 
assumption may be inadequate when severe penalties can be imposed on 
discriminatory employers. Antidiscrimination laws will induce firms to behave in 
such a way that independent observers (for instance, lawyers, economists) cannot 
easily detect discriminatory practices. This problem can be solved by estimating the 
discriminatory wage gap using finite mixture or latent class models because these 
procedures do not require the a priori classification of workers. In fact, the standard 
discrimination model can be seen as a particular case of our method when the 
probabilities of belonging to a group are fixed (to one or zero). We estimate 
discrimination coefficients for Germany and United Kingdom using the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP). We obtain unambiguous higher 
discrimination in Germany for a wide set of measures. 
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1.  Introduction 
Was Michael Jordan, the famous basketball African-American player, discriminated against? 
Standard models answer this question by first assuming that he belonged to a group being 
discriminated against. But if this is the a priori classification, a paradox arises: he is so rich 
that we think the colour of his skin does not guarantee that he actually belonged to the group 
being discriminated against. In fact, Michael Jordan received a huge salary during almost all 
his career.
2 However, he belongs to the group being discriminated against,  according to 
mainstream discrimination economics. In this paper, we offer a different answer by making 
certain estimations assuming that the data will reveal the probability of his being 
discriminated against. Under this proposal, the conclusion may be quite different. Jordan 
would have some probability of belonging to the group that is discriminated against or he 
might not have belonged to such a group. The possibility of not belonging to the group being 
discriminated against is eliminated in the standard wage discrimination analysis. 
Tracing back to Becker (1957), the topic of discrimination in the labour market is concerned 
with wages, selection, promotion and occupational differences between distinct groups of 
people. These differences arise as a result of belonging to a given group and are not related to 
any productivity characteristics of individuals, otherwise they could not be considered 
discriminatory. Moreover, when studying sex discrimination, we must take into account 
possible differences in human capital endowments for each sex, and consider the existence of 
different behaviours and aims with respect to the labour market that are related to gender and 
marital status. 
                                                 




The fact that differences in human capital are not the only factor explaining differences in 
productivity makes discrimination difficult to measure. Moreover, because laws in Western 
countries prohibit intentional, conscious or patent discrimination against members of a 
specific group, discrimination is not easily identifiable. In fact, we believe that it is almost 
impossible to observe wage discrimination directly and that it can be rather imprudent or risky 
to classify people a priori as members of a group that is discriminated against or a group that 
is favoured. However, the traditional way to measure discrimination relies explicitly on this 
assumption because it is based on the estimation of a pair of independent wage equations for 
each group—one for the group that is discriminated against and one for the group that is 
favoured—and these groups are defined using some observable characteristic of the workers, 
such as sex or race (Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973). Hence, it seems that economists base 
their wage discrimination research on information that, as employers are well aware, can be 
very harmful for employers in legal terms, as the importance of litigation proves. Provided 
that there is an informational problem, it would be better from a methodological point of view 
not to assume an aprioristic classification of workers, but rather to attempt to estimate the 
membership of specific groups.  
As a possible solution, we propose the estimation of a finite mixture model (see, for example, 
McLachlan and Peel, 2000), also known as a semiparametric heterogeneity model (Heckman 
and Singer, 1985) or a latent class model (Aitken and Rubin, 1985 and Greene, 2002).
3 This 
technique allows the individuals in the sample to be classified into different groups and 
enables us to evaluate the probability of a specific individual belonging to a particular group, 
even without enough information about his/her membership, or if these groups are not directly 
                                                 





observed. That is, if wage discrimination exists in the labour market and observable worker 
characteristics cannot fully determine whether an individual is a member of the group that is 
discriminated against because of the legal threat that this implies to the employer, we can at 
least evaluate the probability of the individual being a member of such a group using finite 
mixture models. This task will be undertaken without any a priori classification, but instead 
by utilizing data according to probabilistic criteria. Therefore, instead of using the standard 
Oaxaca–Blinder approach to classify workers, we propose a method that evaluates workers on 
a case-by-case basis (maximizing the correspondent likelihood function) to reach a conclusion 
on the existence of wage discrimination and the membership of each worker in the group or 
class that is discriminated against. 
Therefore, the proposed method is a generalization of standard approaches. The standard 
discrimination model (Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973) is deterministic as it assumes fixed 
membership probabilities (either zero or one). However, the proposed approach is 
probabilistic and includes the standard model as a particular case, when the estimated 
probabilities converge for all individuals to either zero or one, depending on an observable 
characteristic, such as sex or race. Moreover, we can estimate the parameters that evaluate the 
effect of a certain variable on the wages of each class and the expected effect on a given 
worker’s salary by taking into account the probability of him/her belonging to each group. 
The theoretical framework of this paper is based on denominated statistical discrimination 
models (Phelps, 1972, and Aigner and Cain, 1977). These models view information problems 
in the labour market as the possible cause of the persistence of discrimination. They allow us 
to explain the existence of wage differences using the actions of profit-maximizing firms, 
which do not have monopsonistic power or preferences for any group of workers (Lundahl 
and Wadensjö, 1984).  
 
  5
If we assume that there is imperfect information in the labour market, workers will be 
reluctant to reveal any information that may negatively affect their wages or working 
conditions. In this context, determining the productivity of each worker may be too expensive 
for an employer, who will prefer to judge each worker using the average characteristics of the 
group to which the worker belongs. A particular worker may consider her/himself 
discriminated against if her/his labour productivity is closer to another group’s average than 
to that of her/his own group yet s/he is paid a similar wage to the members of the group to 
which s/he belongs. Such a case can be called individual discrimination. Moreover, women in 
the workforce may expect some individual discrimination, which could cause them to behave 
differently before entering the labour market. Such differences may affect average 
productivity and labour behaviour. Therefore, the present behavioural differences could help 
to maintain wage differences between sexes in the long run. Models of statistical 
discrimination deal with the signalling role of different groups of workers, which demonstrate 
to the employer the productivity and the type of behaviour that could be expected from the 
group. In this context, not all women or all men will have the same relative position in the 
labour market: some of them will be better off (worse off) compared with the rest of their 
group and with other groups. Hence, we think that any empirical approach should be able to 
control for this individual heterogeneity without assuming that all the members of a particular 
group are discriminated against. These two conditions can be achieved using finite mixture 
models. 
In the empirical exercise, we estimate the degree of discrimination in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and Germany using the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The 
discrimination coefficients for the standard approach and for our proposal are obtained and 
compared. Furthermore, we also apply latent class model methodology to the distributional  
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discrimination approach in Jenkins (1994) and del Rio et al. (2006). We detect an 
overestimation of discrimination under the standard approach, less gender discrimination in 
the UK than in Germany, and an increase and decrease in gender discrimination in Germany 
and the UK during the period 1994–2001, respectively. Moreover, these results are obtained 
from the dominance criterion based on the discrimination curves
4 so the results are valid for 
all indices of discrimination consistent with this criterion: in this sense they are robust. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the standard Oaxaca–
Blinder model. The finite mixture model is examined in Section 3, and Section 4 presents the 
main empirical results. The final section includes some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The traditional empirical framework 
The traditional approach (see Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973) seeks to equate discrimination 
with all wage differentials between groups that cannot be explained by differences in 
individuals’ productivity characteristics. However, the groups are defined aprioristically, and 
each worker is assigned to a group before the wage equations are estimated. Hence, when 
dealing with gender discrimination, we will estimate a different wage equation for each 
gender: 
fi f fi   =   W ε β + X Ln fi
'  (1) 
mi m mi   =   W ε β + X Ln mi
' , (2) 
                                                 
4 The Discrimination Curve is the result of applying the Inverse Generalized Lorenz Curve to the distribution of 
wage gaps (see del Rio et al., 2006).  
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where Wi is the ith individual’s earnings per hour, Xi is the vector of human capital variables, 
β m and β f  are the vectors of returns to these characteristics, εi is the error term and the 
subscripts m and f represent the worker’s gender; male and female, respectively. 
The estimated female individual wage gap (in logarithms) is:  
( ) fi f m fi
cf
fi   =   W W X ˆ ˆ ˆ Ln ˆ Ln
' ' β β − −    (3) 
where 
cf
fi W ˆ is the ith individual’s estimated wage if her attributes were remunerated as if she 
were a male, and β ˆ
m  and β ˆ
f  are the male and female estimated wage coefficient vectors, 
respectively. The estimated individual wage gap in (3) reflects the discrimination experienced 
by a female i. 
The aggregated gap between men’s and women’s wages has traditionally been evaluated in 
the mean distribution of the characteristics. This aggregated gap can be decomposed into a 
discriminatory and a nondiscriminatory wage differential, as in the following expression: 








f m m f m f m =   W   W β β β β β − + − . (4) 
In this equation, the term  ) X -   X ( ˆ
f m
'
m β shows the wage differences that would persist even if 
salary discrimination disappeared. These differences arise from the different average human 
capital endowments among men and women. The discriminatory differences are evaluated 
as( )X β β f f m
' ' ˆ ˆ − , which is the mean value of equation (3). 
Recently, different econometric techniques have been proposed in the literature to take into 
consideration distributional aspects of wage discrimination. Three main approaches can be 
distinguished. In the first approach, the use of quantile regressions has been proposed to  
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increase the number of points in the earnings distribution at which discrimination is evaluated 
(see, for example, Newell and Reilly, 2001, Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman, 2003 and 
Gardeazábal and Ugidos, 2005). A second approach is seen in the proposals to estimate 
counterfactual wage distribution functions to quantify differentials with the observed earnings 
distribution throughout the whole wage range. See, for example, DiNardo et al. (1996) and 
Machado and Mata (2004). Finally, Jenkins (1994) and del Rio et al. (2006) have proposed 
the use of theoretical results in poverty and deprivation literatures to focus the discrimination 
analysis on the entire distribution of individual wage gaps. 
All these approaches distinguish a priori which workers suffer discrimination. However, this 
a priori classification of observations does not reflect the inherent uncertainty of wage 
discrimination. In the following section, we propose a method to overcome this problem.  
 
3.  A finite mixture model to measure wage discrimination 
Finite mixture models, or latent class analysis, are a statistical method for finding subtypes of 
related cases (latent classes) from multivariate categorical data.
5 In our case, they can be used 
to find different kinds of workers in terms of their wage structure, allowing us to find 
different labour market segments and classify workers into these segments. 
It is worth noting that methods that use predefined groups of workers to estimate wage 
equations for each group do not use information contained in one class to estimate wage 
equations for workers who belong to other classes. However, in most empirical applications, 
this interclass information may be quite important because individuals belonging to different 
classes often share common features. If this kind of information were not exploited, it is 
                                                 
5 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) or Beard et al. (1991) for a survey of latent class models. Other recent 
examples can be found in Clark et al. (2005) and Greene (2005).   
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possible that the estimation method would be inefficient.
6 We use a procedure that combines 
standard wage equations and latent class models in order to exploit the information contained 
in the data with greater efficiency. In our model, it is unnecessary to know beforehand which 
group produced an observation because both the individual’s wages and the probability of 
membership of a particular group are estimated simultaneously. Individuals are 
probabilistically separated into several classes, and a wage equation is estimated for each 
class. As each observation may have a nonzero probability of belonging to any class, all the 
observations in the sample are used to estimate all the wage equations.
7 Moreover, the 
proposed methodology allows the sample to be split into groups even when sample-separating 
information is not available. In this case, the finite mixture model uses the goodness of fit of 
each estimated function as additional information to identify groups of individuals. 
In latent class models, individuals are assumed to belong to one of J classes   j = 1, ..., J where 
class membership is unknown. Assuming that the wage structures for each class follow 
standard Mincer’s equations, the standardized normal density function for individual i 



















) ( , (5) 
where Xi is the vector of human capital variables, including educational level, tenure and 
labour experience (see Table A1 for a definition of these variables) and σj is the standard 
deviation of the corresponding group j. As sex is not included in this vector, wages vary 
                                                 
6 Analysis cluster classifies observations according to a priori sample separation information. Therefore, it does 
not use information contained in one class to estimate the other class’s wage equation. 
7 In the standard procedure, we are implicitly restricting the cross-class probabilities to zero and the own 




within a specific group because of human capital differences, but expected wages for men and 
women will be equal once controlled by human capital given group membership. 
The unconditional response probabilities become finite mixtures. The unconditional 
likelihood for individual i is obtained as the weighted sum of her/his j-class likelihood 
functions, where the weights are the probabilities of class membership. That is, 
1 , 1 0 , ) ( ) ( ) , (
1





j ij j ij i P P P f f δ β δ β , (6) 
where β = (β1,…, βJ), δ = (δ1,…,δJ) and  ) ( j ij P δ  represent the probability of individual i being 
a member of class j. These class probabilities are parameterized as a multinomial logit model: 


















δ , (7) 
where qi is a vector of individual-specific variables. In order to estimate sex discrimination, 
we have included workers’ gender in this vector. Therefore, discriminatory wage differences 
between men and women arise from the differences in their probabilities of being members of 
each class of workers, not because men and women are paid differently within each class. 
That is, wage discrimination will arise from the higher probability that women will be 
members of those groups with lower human capital returns, but these groups will include men 
as well. Thus, wages will reflect the uncertainty that we have about the true partitioning of the 
sample, and we believe that this uncertainty is central to the problem that we are analysing. 
The overall log-likelihood function resulting from (6) is a continuous function of the vectors 















j ij j ij
N
i
i P f f f
11 1
) ( ) ( log ) , ( log ) , ( log δ β δ β δ β . (8) 
Under the maintained assumptions, maximum likelihood techniques will give asymptotically 
efficient estimates of all the parameters. The number of classes, J, is taken as given. In our 
case, there will be two classes, J=2, the discriminated and the nondiscriminated classes. 
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This expression shows that the posterior class probabilities depend not only on the estimated δ 
parameters, but also on the vector β, i.e., the parameters from the wage equations and the 
observed wages. 
Once we have efficiently estimated the returns parameters according to the maximum 
likelihood function and the prior and posterior class probabilities, we need only know 
individual’s returns to evaluate wage discrimination. There are two ways to measure 






j ij j i P
1
) ˆ ( · ˆ ˆ δ β β , (10) 
where Pij is individual i’s prior probability of belonging to class j, defined in (7), and  j β ˆ  is 
the estimated marginal effect using the wage equation for class j. Note that here we take into  
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account all the possible returns related to the different classes— j β ˆ —weighted by their prior 
class probabilities—Pij. 
Alternatively, we can examine the posterior class probabilities for each individual following 






j i i j P
1
) | ( · ˆ ˆ β β . (11) 
Obviously, the results obtained by both methods are different. 
To evaluate the individual female wage discrimination coefficient (DCfi), we need a 
counterfactual wage for each female worker to calculate the individual’s discrimination gap. 
This counterfactual wage depends on the human capital endowments and the probabilities of 
belonging to each class if the worker were man rather than woman. In order to do this, we 
estimate counterfactual posterior probabilities, 
cf
i j P | ¸ using equation (9) by changing the value 
of the dummy variable for sex included in vector q when computing the prior probabilities 
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' ˆ ) | ( β  and the wage she would receive if discrimination did not exist, that  
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i j X P
1
| ' ˆ β . 
In the gender discrimination problem, there are two possible classes: not discriminated against 
workers (group 1) and discriminated against workers (group 2); so the wage discrimination 
coefficient can be written as: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () () ()
() () . ' ˆ ' ˆ ) | 1 (
' ˆ ) | 1 ( 1 1 ' ˆ ) | 1 (
' ˆ ) | 2 ( ' ˆ ) | 1 (
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 (13) 
Note the similarities between this expression and equation (3). In fact, if we consider (in line 
with the standard literature on gender discrimination) that men are the group that suffers no 
discrimination (J  =1) and women are the group discriminated against, then we will have 
0 | 1 = i P  and  1 | 1 =
cf
i P  for women. Moreover, the female individual wage discrimination 
coefficient DCfi becomes the female individual wage gap in (3) and the standard Oaxaca–
Blinder approach is obtained as a particular case of our proposal. 










, that is, the women’s mean 
discrimination gap. This expression evaluated for the women’s subsample is: 
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j f i j P
1
ˆ ) | ( ˆ β β denote the average vector of coefficients for men 
and women, respectively, weighted by the posterior probabilities. We used this definition of 
the wage discrimination coefficient to enable comparisons with the standard Oaxaca–Blinder 
approach. This expression is equivalent to the discrimination coefficient defined in Section 2 
(the second term on the right-hand side of equation 4). The only difference is that membership 
in a specific group has a random component, as we assume that groups of workers who are 
discriminated against cannot be defined a priori. 
Two final comments must be done before presenting the empirical results. First, the above 
methodology can be similarly employed to any kind of wage discrimination. We have focused 
the analysis on gender discrimination, but other kinds of discrimination could be considered: 
race, religion, nationality, etc. 
Second, we have applied the latent class methodology to estimate wage equations and we 
have complemented it with the distributional approach in Jenkins (1994) and del Rio et al. 
(2006).  
Let us define hi(DCfi) = max {DCfi, 0} ∀ i= 1,…, N and h as the vector of hi ranked from a 
higher to a lower level of discrimination. The discrimination curve is the sum of the first p per 
cent (0 ≤ p ≤ 100) of h values divided by the total number of females (see del Rio et al., 
2006). Comparison among different discrimination curves is a dominance criterion, which is 
incomplete and it can be characterized by a set of axioms: continuity, focus, monotonicity, 
symmetry, progressive transfers and replication invariance. However, complete indices of 
discrimination consistent with the above axioms can be used if the estimated discrimination 
curves cross. We will see below that the analysis of the discrimination indices consistent with  
 
  15
the above axioms is not necessary in our case as the estimated discrimination curves for UK 
and Germany do not cross. 
 
4.  Results 
In this section, we estimate the finite mixture model and the standard Oaxaca–Blinder (1973) 
model to evaluate sex discrimination in Germany and the United Kingdom. Moreover, we 
apply the proposed methodology to the distributional approach in del Rio et al. (2006). The 
database used in the estimations is the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). This 
database contains data on individuals in 12 European countries, with data for eight years 
available (1994–2001). The information is homogenous across the countries because the 
elaboration process of the survey was coordinated by EUROSTAT, although the size of 
samples varies across countries and years. Given the nature of our study, we have used the 
eight-year incomplete panel for both countries. Moreover, we have singled out information on 
personal characteristics (age, work experience, length of time in the firm, and education), 
wages and labour status for individuals in the samples.  
As mentioned above, we have estimated Mincer’s wage equations. Hence, the natural 
logarithm of the hourly wage in constant terms, Ln(W), is the dependent variable of the wage 
equations. The independent variables are those factors that economic theory suggests as 
possible sources of compensating wage differences for differences in human capital: labour 
experience, tenure and education. Moreover, yearly dummy variables were included to control 
for cyclical effects.  
Education is included by levels using two dummies (EDUC1 and EDUC2). Potential 
experience (POTEXP) and tenure (TENURE) are included in the model to account for on- 
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the-job-training. A quadratic relationship between these variables and wages is expected. To 
represent these relationships, the wage equations include the potential experience and tenure 
squares (POTEXP2 and TENURE2). Table 1 contains information on the average wage rates 
and human capital variables by country and sex. As expected, women have lower wage rates 
in both countries. 
[Table 1] 
Table 2 shows the results of the two-class finite mixture model. For both countries, being a 
woman increases the probability of belonging to the second class, that is, of being rewarded 
on the basis of the wage equation with the lowest intercept. In addition, for the UK, being a 
woman implies the lowest human capital returns. For Germany, human capital returns are 
higher for the second-class members. However, the important differences in both class 
intercepts compensate first-class members well for these lower human capital returns and they 
are better rewarded than second-class members. Thus, as expected, women have a higher 
probability of being in the least-rewarded labour market group, since they have a lower prior 
probability of being in the first group related to their negative estimated coefficient. 
[Table 2] 
POTEXP and POTEXP 2 present the quadratic expected relationship with wages. For both 
groups in both countries, wages increase until approximately 24–25 years of experience have 
been gained. After these maximums, there are diminishing returns to experience. In addition, 
a quadratic relationship is detected for TENURE and TENURE2, but the maximum returns 
differ by country and class.   
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In order to estimate the Oaxaca–Blinder discrimination coefficients, we have estimated men’s 
and women’s wage equations for Germany and the UK. Results are displayed in Table 3. 
[Table 3] 
The estimated equations show a higher intercept for men than for women in both countries, 
with a greater difference between the two intercepts in the German case. Furthermore, 
similarly to the finite mixture estimations, educational returns are lower for German men than 
for German women. However, adding up the intercept and the education level estimated 
effects on wages, German men are better off than women, regardless of their educational 
attainments. On the other hand, in the UK, educational returns are higher for men than for 
women. It is remarkable that among the human capital variables, potential labour experience 
accounts for the main wage differences in both countries. All the estimates in table 2 and 3 are 
statistically significant at the 5% level of significance. As mentioned above, following Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973), we have used the coefficients from the men’s equation to predict 
the earnings that women would have earned if they had been treated as men. We then 
decompose the wage gap into the unexplained differential and the component that can be 
explained by characteristics.  
Discrimination coefficients were calculated using these wage equations and the finite mixture 
models estimations. The results are presented in Table 4, which includes in the first row the 
total wage gap between men and women. The second and third rows of Table 4 present 






It can be observed that the estimated coefficients are lower when workers are not classified a 
priori. It may be an overestimation problem if it is assumed that all women are discriminated 
against from the beginning. It should be pointed out, however, that individual values of the 
estimated discrimination coefficient from the finite mixture model are non-negative for all 
women, although some women have higher posterior probabilities of belonging to the 
privilege group than to the less paid group.  
The discriminating wage difference is the most important component of the observed wage 
difference between men and women. However, its estimated magnitude varies depending on 
the approach: using the finite mixture models, it is around 60%, whereas using the Oaxaca–
Blinder approach, it exceeds 90%. It is also apparent from Table 4 that the wage 
discrimination degree in Germany is larger than in the UK. This is confirmed by the graphical 
analysis below. It can be observed that British total wage gap is smaller than the Oaxaca-
Blinder estimated discrimination coefficient  that means that women should earn more than 
men if discrimination would be eliminated; i.e., characteristic included in the wage equations 
takes in average higher values for women than for men although these differences are quite 
small. 
 
As mentioned above, we have applied the distributional approach in del Rio et al. (2006) to 
the finite mixture model results. We have estimated the discrimination curves for the UK and 
Germany in 1994 and 2001. Figures 1.A and 1.B show the discrimination curves for Germany 
and the UK in 2001 using the wage gaps according to the Oaxaca–Blinder model and the 
individual discrimination coefficients according to the posterior probabilities. We observe that 
the discrimination curve evaluated for the posterior probabilities dominates the Oaxaca–




[Figures 1.A and 1.B] 
 
Figure 2 shows the dominance of UK over Germany according to the discrimination curves, 
indicating greater discrimination in Germany according to any discrimination index consistent 
with these curves.  
[Figure 2] 
 
Finally, in Figure 3.A, despite having greater discrimination, it is shown that Germany 
showed an additional increase in discrimination in the period 1994–2001. This result 
contradicts the evolution given by the classical Oaxaca-Blinder model. In Figure 3.B it is 
shown that the UK reduces the discrimination in this period. 
 
[Figures 3.A and 3.B] 
 
5.  Discussion and conclusions 
If wage discrimination exists in the labour market, observable worker characteristics cannot 
determine whether an individual is a member of the group that is discriminated against 
because of the legal threat that this implies to the employer. However, the traditional Oaxaca–
Blinder (1973) approach assumes that people can be classified a priori as members of a group 
that is discriminated against or a group that is favoured. We believe that this assumption can 
bias results of studies on wage discrimination.   
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To solve this problem we propose the use of finite mixture models. These allow us to classify 
the workers into different groups and estimate, simultaneously, the wage structure for each 
group. Moreover, they also permit evaluation of the probability of a specific individual 
belonging to a particular segment of the labour market and estimate her/his expected wage. 
These models were estimated for Germany and the United Kingdom using the data of the 
European Community Household Panel. From the results of the estimated finite mixture 
models, we can assert that being a woman increases the probability of belonging to the labour 
group with the lowest wages. This result is the main factor explaining wage discrimination 
because wage differences arise from differences in human capital endowments, rather than 
from discrimination, within each group. Moreover, human capital variables (education, labour 
experience and tenure) have been shown to be very important in explaining wage differences 
between individuals. 
Furthermore, the discriminating wage difference is the most important component of the 
observed wage difference between men and women. However, the estimated magnitude of 
this varies from one approach to another. As expected, Oaxaca–Blinder’s (1973) approach 
gives us higher wage discrimination coefficients for both countries, that is, it seems to 
overestimate wage discrimination due to the aprioristic classification of workers. In any case, 
although the discrimination coefficient proposed in this research and based on finite mixture 
models reduces the evaluated differences in wages due to discrimination, this is a problem 
that remains far from solved since the estimated individual discrimination coefficient for all 
women, regardless of country, is positive. 
Finally, inverse discrimination curves are deduced and we obtain unambiguous higher 
discrimination in Germany for a wide set of measures consistent with the inverse 
discrimination curves.  
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Beyond the scope of this paper, the proposed methodology allows us to analyze a relevant 
issue of political economy. As countries follow different active wage discrimination policies, 
the probabilities of women being discriminated against, differs. The larger is the active 
prosecution of wage discrimination, the lower is the probability of discrimination occurring. 
Thus, the greater the enforcement of antidiscrimination policies, the further away from one is 
the probability of women being discriminated against, and, therefore, the larger is the bias 
achieved by estimating the discrimination with the standard Oaxaca–Blinder methodology in 
comparison with the proposed procedure. In this context, the Oaxaca–Blinder approach is 
more appropriate in those countries where discrimination is more “permissive” (or even 
legal). This is an open line to be explored in future research. Another hypothesis to be tested 
is to what extent this bias is an indicator of the degree of active enforcement of 
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Ln(W)  natural logarithm of the woman’s hourly real wage 
EDUC1  =1 if the individual has university studies; =0 otherwise 
EDUC2  =1 if the individual has secondary school studies; =0 otherwise 
POTEXP  potential experience (present age-age when started work) 
POTEXP2
  square of potential experience 
TENURE  years of experience at the current firm 
TENURE2




Table 1. Summary statistics 
 GERMANY  UNITED  KINGDOM 
  Mean Std.  Dev. Mean Std.  Dev. 
Male’s 
Ln(W/H)  2.0190 0.4820  2.0468 0.4920 
EDUC1  0.2408 0.4276  0.5007 0.5000 
EDUC2  0.5859 0.4926  0.1420 0.3490 
TENURE  8.7976 6.7262  5.1892 5.1043 









Ln(W/H)  1.7536 0.4707 1.8667 0.4704 
EDUC1  0.2111 0.4081 0.4314 0.4953 
EDUC2  0.5936 0.4912 0.1425 0.3496 
TENURE  7.2637 6.1056 4.6491 4.4976 










Table 2. Two latent class model of wages 










Wage equation for latent class 1 
CONSTANT  1.53436 0.00887 1.57134 0.01087 
EDUC1  0.40728 0.00329 0.28463 0.00373 
EDUC2  0.10063 0.00307 0.14508 0.00595 
TENURE  0.01950 0.00078 0.00952 0.00130 
TENURE2  -0.00018 0.00003 -0.00045 0.00007 
POTEXP  0.02860 0.00041 0.03106 0.00050 
POTEXP2  -0.00058 0.00001 -0.00061 0.00001 
σ  0.28186 0.00027 0.29830 0.00080 
 
Wage equation for latent class 2 
CONSTANT  0.76528 0.01309 1.10080 0.00906 
EDUC1  0.43196 0.00664 0.18208 0.00356 
EDUC2  0.23043 0.00573 0.14438 0.00559 
TENURE  0.03765 0.00143 0.02017 0.00119 
TENURE2  -0.00093 0.00006 -0.00074 0.00006 
POTEXP  0.03530 0.00066 0.02784 0.00045 
POTEXP2  -0.00072 0.00002 -0.00058 0.00001 
σ  0.38322 0.00075 0.30189 0.00081 
 
Estimated prior probabilities 
CONSTANT  0.80300 0.03655 0.04640 0.04072 












Table 3. Men and women wage equations 










Male’s Wage equation 
CONSTANT  1.24468 0.01408 1.34001 0.01212 
EDUC1  0.23249 0.01136 0.14568 0.00842 
EDUC2  0.14348 0.00881 0.08646 0.00916 
TENURE  0.01408 0.00134 0.00790 0.00172 
TENURE2  -0.00022 0.00006 -0.00031 0.00010 
POTEXP  0.04475 0.00127 0.03974 0.00115 

















Women’s wage equation 
CONSTANT  1.10519 0.01537 1.27302 0.01212 
EDUC1  0.33734 0.01432 0.14019 0.00810 
EDUC2  0.20267 0.00997 0.09257 0.00842 
TENURE  0.01837 0.00162 0.00880 0.00183 
TENURE2  -0.00040 0.00008 -0.00037 0.00011 
POTEXP  0.02977 0.00141 0.02903 0.00113 






















Table 4. Wage differences decomposition 
Model GERMANY  UNITED  KINGDOM 
 
Total Wage Gap 
 
26.542 18.009 
















= = 1 1
| ' ˆ ) | ( ' ˆ β β   11.066 6.439   
Oaxaca-Blinder approach: 
( ) X β   β f f m




Figure 1.A Wage discrimination in Germany (2001) 
 

























































Figure 1.B Wage discrimination in the United Kingdom (2001) 
 































































































































Figure 3.A Discrimination change in Germany (1994-2001) 
 




























































Figure 3.B Discrimination change in the United Kingdom (1994-2001) 
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